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According to James Woodward (2003), causal explanation can be characterized as tracking dependencies that are invariant under interventions. When we are interested in causal explanations within a structure of multiple causal relations (a mechanism), an additional invariance requirement of modularity has to be imposed on the explanatory representation of the system: a local intervention on a part of the structure should not change other dependencies in the structure. The corresponding ontological concept of modularity, the presupposed causal property of the modeled system, is often characterized as a requirement that it should be possible to disrupt or break individual sub-mechanisms of the system without affecting other sub-mechanisms. This concept of modularity has generated criticism against the invariance account of causality based on cases in which intuitively straightforward and mundane causal systems seem to break the ontological modularity condition (Cartwright 2001, 2002, 2004). Here I argue that the invariance account should indeed be augmented by making a distinction between two notions of modularity: variable modularity and parameter modularity. The distinction between variables and parameters is largely pragmatic and reflects what is to be explained and what is taken as given when formulating a causal explanatory model. Although pragmatic, this distinction is unavoidable in modeling; there is no complete causal model of any given system. Questions of modularity are therefore sensible only in the context of models of specific causal structures, not systems as a whole.

Modularity properties of a model determine what can and what cannot be explained by it. In this paper I also make an additional claim that variable modularity is required for causal explanation of changes within a system, and parameter modularity for constitutive explanation of a property of the whole system by the causal properties of its parts and their organization. The criticism against the invariance account of causal explanation can now be answered by showing that it is based on cases in which the condition of parameter modularity apparently fails, and therefore only shows that in such cases a constitutive explanation of system properties is impossible, not causal explanation of the workings of the system as it is. This paper thus aims to respond to criticisms leveled against the invariance account of causal explanation, augment the invariance account of causal explanation, and develop the theory of constitutive explanation further.
 
2. Causal Explanation and Modularity

According to Woodward (1979, 2003), explanation consists in tracing or exhibiting functional dependency relations between variables. Explanations are contrastive both in the explanandum and in the explanans: they are of the form Y = y1 rather than y2,…,yn because X=x1 rather than x2,…xn. We can therefore think of explanatory relationships as being of the general form Y = f(X), where Y is the explanandum variable and X a set of explanans variables and where the possible values of the variables form the contrast classes. Exhibiting dependency relationships creates understanding by providing answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions (w-questions) concerning the consequences of counterfactual or hypothetical changes in the values of the explanans variables. This is the crucial modal import of explanatory relationships that sets them apart from non-explanatory regularities.

In the case of causal explanations, the relevant hypothetical changes are interventions, i.e. ideally surgical manipulations that directly affect only a single explanans variable of interest. Causal relations are invariant under interventions in the sense that the explanatory dependency f should not itself break down when X is intervened on (at least within some range of the possible values of X). The concept of intervention is designed to distinguish between genuine causal dependencies from inferential connections between variables and to clarify cases of confounding and multiple causal pathways. The concept of intervention also links causal dependence to manipulability: X is a cause of Y if we can make Y wiggle by wiggling X. Causal explanations are thus change-relating in the sense that it has to make conceptual and nomological sense to causally change the values of both of the explanation relata. The relata of singular causal explanations are specific values of variables and these can be understood in the standard way as property instantiations in time, ie.e. as events. (Woodward 2003)








in which the values of a variable Xi on the left hand side of the equality are (directly) caused by the values of the (set of) right hand side variables Xi, according to a sub-mechanism described by the function fi and the parameter set pi. A dependent variable on the left hand side can itself be present in the set of causes (on the right hand side) of one or more other variables. According to the invariance account, such a system of equations is a correct causal model of the intended causal structure if and only if it correctly predicts the results of interventions. An intervention sets the value of a variable in a way that bypasses and blocks (“wipes out”) the influence of the mechanism normally determining the value of that particular variable while leaving everything else intact. When the effect of an intervention is evaluated with a causal model, intervening on a variable Xi simply means replacing the function fi with the target value of Xi and replacing every instance of Xi in the other functions with the target value. Leaving everything else intact means that the intervention does not change the functional forms fn or the parameter sets pn, or the values of other variables in a way that does not follow from the replacement of Xi with the target value according to the system of equations (for example, it should not change variables that are not causally downstream of Xi).

It therefore follows from the invariance account of causal explanation that it has to be possible to intervene on individual variables of the causal structure in such a way that the causal dependencies (functional forms or parameter sets) not directly targeted by that particular intervention do not change. This particular form of independence of parts is commonly called modularity (a.k.a. autonomy or equation invariance).  If there is a correct causal model of a causal structure, a model that predicts the consequences of ideal interventions, it has to be modular in variables. All causal models are underdetermined by observational data in the sense that observed associations between a set of variables may always have been produced by a number of different causal structures. Considered simply as a mathematical object without the modularity constraint, a system of equations can only represent the associations. Only the model that predicts correctly what would happen if we changed the system by intervening, the model that is true to the underlying modularity, exhibits the true causal structure. (Pearl 2000, 22-29; Woodward 2003, 48-49, 327-339) 

If an actual intervention on the causal structure changes the system in a way that is not represented in the model, e.g. if it changes the sub-mechanisms represented in the model as the functional forms or parameter sets of other variables, the model as it stands does not give correct answers to what-if-things-had-been-different questions concerning the state of the system after the intervention. If we intervened on a causal input corresponding to variable Xi in a model, and the intervention, no matter how surgical, also changed the dependencies within the structure, or directly other variables affecting variables causally downstream of Xi, the model would give incorrect predictions about the consequences of the intervention. Hence, the model does not provide causal understanding of the workings of the system and the causal role of the variable in it. In most cases, this just means that a new and improved model that explicitly represents or endogenizes these additional dependencies is needed. However, if the system cannot be correctly modeled as modular in variables in any level of description or decomposition, if the system itself is not modular, no what-if-things-had-been-different-questions concerning interventions in the system can be answered, and there can be no causal understanding of the system. The criticisms against the invariance account of causality that is addressed here is based on the claim that most ordinary causal systems are of such kind, and that the invariance account cannot be a correct theory of causation or causal explanation for this reason.

Modularity and its connection to principles linking the structural properties of the model to the properties of the joint distribution of the variables (such as the causal Markov condition) form a much discussed and disputed topic in the recent philosophy of causation using the Bayes-nets formalism (see e.g., Hausman and Woodward 1999; Cartwright 2002; Steel 2005). It is worth emphasizing that, contrary to what some critics seem to claim (e.g., Cartwright 2001), modularity in variables does not exclude non-linearity or interaction effects between causal factors in the system under investigation. For example, in the case of causal Bayes-nets, the causal Markov condition, which renders consequences of local changes in the joint distribution tractable according to the associated causal graph, does not impose any restrictions on the functional forms of the structural dependencies, nor on the marginal distributions of the exogenous variables (Pearl 2000, 30-31; Steel 2005). Interaction effects and non-linearity are not the main issue here, since they do not make causal inference and explanation impossible as long as the effects of local changes in individual variables in a causal model are well defined and tractable.

3. Variables and Parameters 

It is often claimed that the modularity requirement reflects the ontological idea that causal mechanisms are composed of parts enjoying an independent existence, and that the causal roles played by the parts of the mechanism are mostly derived from the intrinsic causal properties of the parts (e.g., Pearl 2000, 23-29; Steel 2007, Ch. 3, Woodward 2003, 48-49). When a mechanic is fixing a combustion engine, he presumes that when replacing a damaged part with a part that is functionally equivalent in the relevant ways, the replacement should not affect the causal properties and functions of the remaining parts. However, notice that this ontological locality requirement is different from the modularity requirement for causal models, according to which the functional forms or parameter values of the separate dependencies in the model should not change when values of some variables are changed by an intervention. The possibility of intervening on the values of variables imposes a weaker modularity requirement than that which would be required for the possibility of independently changing the functional forms or parameter sets that represent individual sub-mechanisms. We can call the latter requirement parameter modularity: a causal model is modular in parameters, if values of parameters pi (or the functional form) of a dependency fi can be altered without changing the values of parameters pj (or the functional form) of other dependencies fj.

The distinction between variables and parameters is usually well defined in the context of a given model. It is largely a matter of the aims of modeling, a consequence of the somewhat arbitrary but unavoidable division between what is endogenous and what is left exogenous and what is thought of as changeable and what fixed. Causal relations are change relating and what are perceived to be the relevant causal relations depends, to some extent, on what kinds of changes are thought to be relevant. If the modeler is interested in how some features of a system are determined by other features of a system, she endogenizes these features as dependent variables. If some features are taken for granted or possible changes in these features are thought to be unlikely or irrelevant, they are left as parameters. 

It is impossible to model a causal system completely, i.e. to endogenize everything as dependent variables. Complexity has to be approached piecemeal and preferably from different alternative perspectives (cf. Wimsatt 2007). A distinction should therefore be made between a causal system and a causal structure. A causal system is a (more or less) spatiotemporally delineated piece of the world or a tangible set of phenomena, such as a machine, an organism, an organ or an economy. A causal system is usually a concrete thing that has a boundary or an interface with its environment that is recognizable without knowing the inner causal workings of the system. A causal structure (a mechanism) is a set of causal relations within a system, definable only against a background of causal properties ignored or held fixed. A causal system is comprised of multiple causal structures and what is left as the fixed background for a given causal structure determines the parameters of that structure. A causal structure can be modular in variables, although not in parameters, if those particular properties of the sub-mechanisms (causal relations) that are taken as given cannot be individually altered without affecting other sub-mechanisms, but the causal properties defined as variables can. It makes sense to ask what the modularity properties of a given causal structure are, but not whether a system is modular tout court. 





As an example of what can and what cannot be explained on the basis of a given model with given modularity properties, let us now consider an example originally discussed by Nancy Cartwright (2004). In one of her criticisms of what she calls modularity theories of causation, Cartwright presents an example of a mundane causal system, the carburetor, that purportedly violates the modularity condition as presented by Hausman, Pearl and Woodward, among others. First, I will argue that the model of the carburetor, and the relevant causal structure within the carburetor, is in fact modular in variables but not in parameters. I will then argue that if the model really were unmodular in variables, it would be quite useless and would not provide any understanding of the causal workings of the carburetor. The lesson to be drawn this hypothetical example is that the workings of a truly holistic carburetor simply could not be understood, at least not on the level of description used by Cartwright. 

Cartwright’s carburetor works according to the following equations (2004, 810):

gas in chamber = f (airflow, pumped gas, gas exiting emulsion tube; a)
airflow = g (air pressure in chamber; b)
gas exiting emulsion tube = h (gas in emulsion tube, air pressure in chamber; c)
air pressure in chamber = j (suck of the pistons, setting of throttle valve; d)

where a,b,c and d are parameter sets, all dependent on the geometry of the carburetor chamber. Cartwright claims that since the parameters in all of the functions are dependent (in a non-specified way) on the geometry of the carburetor, one cannot individually meddle with a single equation without affecting the others. The system is thus not modular. In fact, Cartwright claims that this failure of modularity is just good engineering, since one physical design underwrites and ensures many causal relations at once. (Cartwright 2004, 810-811)

Contrary to what Cartwright says, the carburetor model is (or is naturally interpreted to be) modular in variables, although not modular in parameters, and this difference is also crucial for the kinds of explanations the model does and does not provide. If the model is modular in variables, it is adequate for causal explanation of processes that drive the carburetor.  The equations would not make much sense if they did not correctly tell the causal story of how the petrol in the chamber depends on the pumped petrol and the petrol exiting the emulsion tube, which in turn depends on the air-pressure and so forth, given the particular geometry. That the equations tell the correct causal story simply means that intervening on the value of a variable should not change the values of other variables, unless they are causally downstream in the model and the model says that they should change in a certain way. Neither should an intervention on a variable change the values of any of the parameters. If the equations tell the correct direct causal contribution of the gas exiting emulsion tube (encoded in function f), then intervening (miraculously) on the value of the gas exiting emulsion tube should not change the value of gas in chamber through changes in air pressure and airflow.​[2]​ Cartwright does not give any arguments to the effect that the model should not be interpreted in this way and therefore no reasons for a claim that the model is not modular in variables.

However, since the model does not specify the dependency between the geometry and the parameters, it does not tell how to go about in designing the geometry if one had in mind specific dependencies between the causal variables. If one were to change a parameter in one equation, the other equations would also change, just as Cartwright claimed, and the model is therefore not modular in parameters. The failure of parameter modularity means that the model leaves us in the dark regarding the crucial question of how the parameters would change if the geometry were modified: it cannot be used to answer w-questions concerning the effects of changes in parameters. Thus, the model is ill-fit for engineering purposes. The failure of modularity in the parameters severely limits our understanding of the constitutive role of the geometry, but the modularity of the variables gives us an understanding of the causal workings of the carburetor, once the geometry is fixed. Cartwright is right in claiming that the carburetor system is not modular, but the invariance account of causal explanation can be saved by making the distinctions between a causal system and a causal structure and between variable modularity and parameter modularity.

Now let us consider a case in which the model of the carburetor would in fact be unmodular in variables as well as in parameters. This would mean that by exogenously setting the throttle, one would not only affect air pressure and, consequently, petrol exiting the emulsion tube and airflow, but also the way in which these variables depend on the air pressure (i.e., the functions f,g,h and j). This would mean not only causal interaction (modularity allows for interaction effects to be included in the equations), but also changes in the equations themselves. One can only interpret this as a claim that the setting of the throttle affects the very geometry of the carburetor.​[3]​ This kind of holism would mean that the model as presented above gives us very limited understanding of the inner causal workings of the carburetor, since few w-questions could be answered. Modeling such a holistic carburetor would be a much more demanding enterprise because one would have to endogenize the parameters describing the effects of geometry as dependent on the original variables (such as throttle). Indeed, this kind of design would be quite poor engineering. 

5. Parameter Modularity and Constitutive Explanation

The parameters of the carburetor depend constitutively on the underlying geometry. To see how the modularity properties of a model determine what can be explained by it, let us briefly apply the above reasoning to constitutive explanations in general.  Constitutive explanations provide information on why, or in virtue of what, a system has some property, not how it (etiologically) came to have that property (see e.g. Craver 2006; 2007, chapters 3 and 4; Cummins 1984, Ch. 1). Although constitutive explanation is an important form of non-causal explanation, the basic ideas of Woodward’s theory of causal explanation as tracing dependencies between variables, where the possible values of the variables form the contrast classes of the explanation relata, can be extended to constitutive explanations. The macro-property depends constitutively on the micro-properties in the sense that if the micro-properties had been different, the macro-property would have been different as well (in some systematic way). For example, the elasticity of a solid depends constitutively on the lattice structure of the atoms and the inter-atomic forces holding the lattice together. By approximating the inter-atomic forces with Hooke’s law, one can derive the so-called Young’s modulus, which links the inter-atomic force function and the potential to the elasticity. The model tells us that if one were to change the inter-atomic forces (the spring constant in the Hooke’s law) one would end up with a well-defined change in the elasticity of the solid. The explanatory properties of this model derive from a similar kind of invariance under local changes that was required of causal explanations; it is just that now the dependency is constitutive, not causal. The crucial issue is still that consequences of (physically or conceptually) local changes have to be tractable in order for it to be possible to answer w-questions about counterfactual situations, and the only way these questions are answerable is that the dependency relations themselves are not disrupted by the change. 





The macro property -ing is constitutively dependent on properties of the realizing mechanism. This realizing mechanism itself is usually taken to be a causal structure (Craver 2007, 105; Glennan 2005; Steel 2007, Ch. 3; Woodward 2002). If a causal model of the realizing mechanism is correct, the causal structure of the mechanism, namely its functional forms and parameter values, should not change under interventions on variables. The properties of the realizing mechanism are therefore defined precisely as that which should remain invariant under interventions on causal micro-variables. 
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^1	  Trends and Tensions in Intellectual Integration, Philosophy of Science Group, University of Helsinki. E-mail: jaakko.kuorikoski@helsinki.fi
^2	  Although it might be the case that air pressure and airflow may not be interpretable as modular variables since they are, in a sense, too closely linked via the Bernoulli principle. This is a difficult issue that cannot be adequately addressed here.
^3	  To a certain extent it probably does. However, this dependency is an example of the sort of complications that are intentionally left out of models by making idealizing assumptions.
^4	  This replacement also underscores the fact that the explanandum of a constitutive explanation is often a disposition, not an occurrent behavior such as S-ing. 
